Could the Use of Derivatives Create a “Toxic Brew?”
This post continues my consideration of some conceptual questions underlying the SEC's proposed Rule 18f-4. The following comment on the proposal caught my attention:
Congress is stating [in Section 1(b) of the Investment Company Act] that there is a problem when leverage unduly increases the "speculative character" (what we now call risk) of the investments. This was particularly a problem back in the 1930s … [when the] combination of opaque products, complex capital structures, pyramiding, bad corporate governance, and leverage created a toxic brew that resulted in serious losses for unwary investors.Although this wasn't the commenter's point, it struck me that derivatives have the potential to present today all of the problems that senior securities presented in the 1930. Opacity The SEC's Division of Economic and Risk Analysis released a companion white paper for proposed Rule 18f-4. The white paper catalogued the following challenges encountered when trying to use fund financial reports to determine the notional amount of derivatives used by mutual funds.
- A significant percentage of funds do not clearly report the notional amounts for various derivatives or provide precise descriptions of notional amounts.
- There is no standardized reporting of derivatives.
- When notional amounts were reported, there were instances where they were not consistent with other parameters of the derivatives.
- Many derivatives or underlying assets were denominated in foreign currencies.
- For some types of derivatives, funds may enter into offsetting transactions in order to reduce or eliminate their economic exposure. In some cases, both initial and offsetting transactions continued to be reported on the fund's schedule of investments.
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